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Fraud has a significant effect on society. It has been estimated to cost the UK 
economy more than £50 billion annually (National Fraud Authority (NFA), 
2013, p.2) and the Government has signalled its determination to tackle these 
losses through a range of preventative, enforcement and collaborative 
activities. Diminishing police resources allocated to fraud mean that this 
activity will need to be delivered by both law enforcement and civilian counter 
fraud teams (Attorney General's Office (AGO), 2006, pp.128-129; Cabinet 
Office & NFA, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
This research sought to establish whether UK central government 
organisations have the legal powers, skills and regulation needed to tackle 
fraud effectively. It was concluded from the literature review that an effective 
legal framework, supported by a wide range of skills, is essential to the 
delivery of the UK government’s zero tolerance approach, and that both 
professional standards, and the civil rights of those subject to investigation, 
should be protected through some form of regulation.  Empirical data, 
collected via a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview programme, 
suggested that the effectiveness of central government civilian counter fraud 
teams is hampered by a fragmented legal landscape and a lack of skills, and 
that further professionalisation and regulation is needed to protect 
professional standards and individual legal rights. 
Key words: counter-fraud, fraud, legal powers, professionalism, regulation, 
training 
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Introduction 
Fraud is estimated to cost the UK economy £52 billion annually, of which 
£20 billion is seen to relate to the public sector (NFA, 2013, p. 2). In 2011, the 
UK Government published its strategy to tackle fraud in two principal 
documents – ‘Eliminating Public Sector Fraud’ and ‘Fighting Fraud Together’ 
(Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011a, 2011b).  Both documents signalled an 
intention to decrease the losses to the UK economy due to fraud – and in 
particular, the £20 billion lost to the UK public sector in both 2011 and 2012 
(NFA, 2012, p. 7; 2013, p. 2). Both documents place a significant emphasis 
on fraud awareness and prevention, as recommended by the Fraud Review 
Final Report published in July 2006 (AGO, 2006, pp. 8, 116). Both also 
emphasise the need for improved information on fraud whether this be 
improved intelligence on fraudster behaviour and activity (Fighting Fraud 
Together) or in the risks and threats faced by individual organisations 
(Eliminating Public Sector Fraud).   
‘Eliminating Public Sector Fraud’ also emphasised the need for a collaborative 
response to implementing a zero tolerance approach to fraud, while ‘Fighting 
Fraud Together’ stressed the need for more effective enforcement activity to 
detect those committing fraud and ensure that they receive appropriate 
sanctions. Limitations on police resources mean that this approach will need 
to be delivered by both law enforcement and civilian counter fraud teams and 
particularly as fraud is not a policing priority (Home Office, 2004; Gannon and 
Doig, 2010, p39). Each major central government body is required to have a 
counter fraud champion to improve knowledge of fraud against Government 
departments (Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011b, p. 16). 
The collaborative working envisaged by the Cabinet Office presents a number 
of practical challenges. The activities of many public sector bodies are 
principally governed by their enabling legislation, the common law or the 
Royal Prerogative (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2003). Differing legal 
frameworks can lead to both ineffectiveness and inefficiency when tackling 
fraud. Fisher, (2010, p.1), for example, posits that the present arrangements 
for fighting fraud in the UK’s financial markets ‘are lamentably deficient’. One 
of the reasons for this is that, the bodies concerned operate under different 
Overview Journal Article  
      Page 
 
6 
statutory frameworks which leads to “overlapping responsibilities and an 
unnecessary duplication of both manpower and specialist resources”. 
Convergence in legal frameworks and powers is insufficient in itself to ensure 
effective counter fraud management. Fraud management needs skilled staff 
with knowledge of the law, investigative techniques, the ability to manage 
evidence and exhibits and take witness statements and the capability to 
provide interview transcripts and surveillance evidence. It also requires a high 
degree of inter-personal and interviewing skills (Button, Johnston and 
Frimpong, 2008, p. 245).  In addition, fraud investigations need access to 
specialist skills such as accounting and computer forensics, and especially 
the latter, as more and more information is held in electronic rather than paper 
format. Similarly, fraud prevention needs staff skilled in system design and 
control, so that appropriate action can be taken to identify and counter 
potential threats and control weaknesses which could lead to theft, data loss 
or corrupt activity (Krambia-Kapardis, 2002, p. 245). 
It appears that staff qualified in these areas are thinly spread. The reasons for 
this are complex. Research by Frimpong and Baker (2007, p. 132) suggests 
that this may be due to the low status afforded to counter fraud staff, a lack of 
resources, inadequate training, poor pay, poor career prospects, management 
apathy and out of date legislation.  
However, the Cabinet Office proposals for tackling fraud in the UK public 
sector and economy only partially deal with these issues. While their 
proposals for eliminating public sector fraud refer to the need to train all staff 
and change organisational cultures there is no mention of the skills, training 
and retention issues for the front line staff who are to deliver these proposals. 
The same is true for their proposals for tackling fraud in the UK economy 
(Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011a, 2011b). 
The Cabinet Office has alluded to the need for improved governance over 
counter fraud activities. To achieve this, it proposes that different 
organisations and sectors come together under some form of umbrella 
arrangements (Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011b, p. 22). However, it is silent on 
how those bodies that have legal powers to counter fraud should have their 
activities regulated – despite the fact that, in using these powers, civilian 
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counter fraud bodies can cause harm. In one case, a fraud investigation 
against a professional, precipitated by a whistleblowing letter to the relevant 
counter fraud service, led to his business going into administration despite the 
judge halting the trial against him and stating, ‘You leave [this courtroom] 
vindicated with your good name intact and your head held high’ (Baker, 2011, 
p. 5). Regulation can also help to underpin professional standards and the 
quality of the investigative process. 
In avoiding such regulation, civilian counter fraud teams within the public 
service are treated differently from the Police, the UK Border Force, the 
private security industry and HM Revenue and Customs each of whom are, or 
will be, subject to external regulation (IPCC, 2011; SIA, 2014). While 
professional bodies such as The Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists exist, 
membership is voluntary. The current situation makes the application of 
common standards difficult and holding individuals, teams and organisations 
to account for their actions, problematic. 
The aim of the research presented in this article was to examine, through 
empirical research, the legal powers and skills available to UK central 
government counter fraud champions to manage their fraud risk effectively. It 
also considered whether, in exercising their powers, civilian counter fraud 
champions are subject to appropriate regulation and control. 
Methodology 
Empirical data was collected through a mixed methods approach. It involved a 
programme of semi-structured interviews with representatives from 26 
different organisations who were placed in one of three groups (Table 1) and 
a postal survey of all 32 senior civil service counter fraud champions from 
which a 50 per cent response rate was obtained.  
Figure 1: Interview summary 
Group  Number 
interviewed 
Group 1 Representatives from central government counter 
fraud teams.  
11 
Group 2 Representatives from the wider counter fraud 
community that included those working for 
regulators, law enforcement, academia and audit 
organisations.  
8 
Group 3 Representatives from policy organisations, 7 
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professional institutes and professional bodies.  
Total  26 
 
The questionnaires were distributed by e-mail, with the support of the 
responsible department, to the counter fraud champions with a covering letter. 
The survey was restricted to public sector counter fraud champions, whereas 
the interview programme represents a more wide-ranging and detailed review 
that included policy makers, regulators, academics and others who are one 
step removed from front line service delivery.  
Research Findings 
This research sought to shed more light on the issues surrounding the legal 
powers, skills and regulatory framework in place to deliver the Government’s 
vision for tackling fraud in the UK central government sector. The implications 
of these findings are then applied to the Government’s current enforcement 
policies and their zero tolerance approach in particular. 
Legal Powers 
Interviewees and survey respondents were asked about the legal powers 
available to them when conducting counter fraud work. These covered the 
authority to investigate, surveillance, information sharing, interviewing, the 
acquisition of evidence, arrest and detention, prosecution and redress. 
Table 2 lists the responses given to questions about legal powers to 
investigate fraud. The responses are similar to those found by Fisher (2012) 
who posited that differing legal frameworks adversely affect the effective 
delivery of counter fraud services. This research showed, for example, that 
between one third and one half of the bodies indicated that they do not have 
the legal power to investigate fraud and, for those that do, their ability to 
investigate fraud is constrained. 
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Figure 2: Gap analysis of powers available to central government bodies 
No Question DESIRED 
(1) 
PERCEIVED SURVEY 
2012 
The power to investigate  
A.1 The power to conduct fraud and other investigations to the civil and criminal standard 100% 65% 50% 
The power to conduct surveillance  
A.2 The power to conduct directed Surveillance with and without RIPA registration 80% 61% 25% 
A.3 The power to monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working in official premises 100% 100% 63% 
A.4 The power to monitor contractor e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises 
with or without a warrant or RIPA registration 
96% 91% 38% 
The power to obtain and share information  
A.5 The power to issue third parties with a notice under s29 (3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 
when seeking information in a fraud or corruption enquiry 
100% 83% 38% 
A.6 The power to share data with law enforcement and private sector security and civilian 
counter fraud teams 
100% 87% 68% 
The Power to Interview  
A.7 The power to interview and take witness statements 100% 96% 75% 
A.8 The power to interview under caution 80% 74% 19% 
A.9 The power to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview with self 
incrimination safeguards 
80% 48% 19% 
A.10 The power to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview without 
self incrimination safeguards 
32% 22% 6% 
The Power to Obtain Evidence  
A.11 The power to obtain a search and seize warrant 68% 22% 0% 
A.12 The power to obtain production / other information gathering orders 88% 43% 0% 
A.13 The power to obtain and review financial and finance related documents 88% 43% 38% 
A.14 The power to enter third party premises (e.g. contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to 
seize documents, computers and other evidential material with a warrant 
60% 26% 0% 
A.15 The power to receive information and / or documents and / or evidence from a source when 
permission from the document / evidence owners has not been granted 
76% 22% 31% 
A.16 The power to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence with self incrimination safeguards 
76% 30% 13% 
A.17 The power to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence without self incrimination safeguards 
32% 9% 6% 
A.18 The power to search an individual while on official premises 72% 35% 25% 
A.19 The power to search an employee’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises 
without a warrant / other court order 
96% 87% 56% 
A.20 The power to search a contractor’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without 
a warrant / other court order 
92% 83% 50% 
A.21 The power to forensically examine and copy an employees work computer without a warrant 
/ other court order 
100% 96% 69% 
A.22 The power to forensically examine and copy a contractor’s computer system without a 
warrant / other counter order 
88% 78% 6% 
The Power to Apprehend and Detain  
A.23 The power to arrest an individual when suspected of fraud and / or corruption against your 
organisation 
16% 4% 0% 
The Power to Prosecute  
A.24 The ability to bring prosecutions in the organisation’s own right for fraud and  
corruption cases – rather than through law enforcement and the CPS 
72% 35% 6% 
The Power to Obtain Redress  
A.25 The power to issue a formal caution 60% 17% 6% 
A.26 The power to make a compensation claim under the civil law for losses suffered 92% 78% 50% 
A.27 The power to make a compensation claim under the criminal law for losses suffered 88% 78% 19% 
A.28 The power to recover sums paid in salary and other benefits, while employed or on 
suspension, if the case against the accused is proven (2) 
84% 61% 13% 
A.29 The power to recover investigation costs (2) 84% 26% 13% 
A.30 The power to issue an administrative penalty 72% 17% 31% 
Note (1): One interviewee declined to offer an opinion on the powers that civilian counter fraud teams should have. 
Note (2) These items were included as one power for the survey. However, following further research, it was decided to split these into two separate 
powers for the interview programme as they represent recoveries from two distinct areas of recoverable expenditure. 
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In addition, representatives from some organisations reported that they did 
not have the power to monitor employee e-mails and other communications, 
while a quarter of survey respondents stated that they were unable to conduct 
interviews or take witness statements. Less than one half of interviewees, and 
no survey respondents, believed they could obtain warrants or production 
orders to obtain information or enter third party premises. Similarly, less than 
one half of all interviewees, and less than a quarter of survey respondents, 
considered that they could compel staff and third parties to attend for 
interview. However, the perceived ability to obtain and review finance and 
financial related documentation was similar between the two populations at 
around 40 per cent of respondents. Conversely, there was a difference 
between the two populations over data sharing. While 83 per cent of 
interviewees considered that they could request information under section 29 
of the Data Protection Act 1998 this figure fell to 38 per cent of survey 
respondents.  
These findings show that many central government bodies may be severely 
constrained in their ability to obtain the information needed to investigate 
fraud and corruption, and particularly as: only around two thirds of 
interviewees and one quarter of survey respondents can search an official 
while on their premises; some interviewees and survey respondents report 
that they cannot search their staffs’ lockers and desks, or forensically analyse 
an employee’s computer; and one quarter of interviewees and four fifths of 
survey respondents report that they cannot interview under caution. This 
further suggests that central government bodies may struggle to fill the gap 
caused by a lack of law enforcement capacity to tackle financial crime 
(Gannon and Doig, 2010, pp. 40, 50-51). It also casts doubts on whether they 
can provide the complementary policing resource envisaged by the Fraud 
Review Final Report (AGO, 2006, pp. 9-10). 
Table 3 summarises responses from interviewees who considered that a lack 
of powers was having a deleterious effect on their ability to manage fraud. 
These have been grouped into the following categories: Policy and Strategy 
Formulation; Risk Management, Detection, Investigation, Sanctions; 
Deterrence and Prevention. It shows that all major aspects of fraud 
management are affected.  
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While investigation was seen to be the most affected area, as expected, the 
most significant effect according to interviewees lay in its impact on policy and 
strategy formulation.  Their accounts suggested that, by inhibiting their 
understanding of how and why fraud is committed, it is more difficult for those 
managing fraud in these organisations to identify what constitutes a 
proportionate response, and justify appropriate levels of investment, as the full 
extent of the fraud problem may be understated. 
Figure 3: Identified effect of a lack of legal powers 
Policy and Strategy Formation 
It inhibits an understanding of how and why fraud is committed  
Risk Management 
It inhibits the development of business centred fraud typologies 
It impacts on the development of fraud risk assessments 
Detection 
It inhibits an understanding of how to tackle fraudster methods 
It inhibits proactive fraud detection 
Investigations 
It makes it difficult to apply a public interest test 
Easier investigations will be cherry picked which reduces recoveries and fraud prevention 
A sub-optimal number of investigations are undertaken  
It affects consistency of treatment when allegations are received 
It impacts on evidence collection 
It causes difficulties in referring cases to law enforcement as the evidence needed cannot 
be collected 
Frauds go uninvestigated as the police are reluctant to become involved 
Sanctions 
It has a deleterious effect on the administration of justice 
It affects the ability to levy effective sanctions and penalties  
Deterrence 
There is a lack of an effective visible response 
It impacts on deterrence and prevention 
It undermines counter fraud control systems / structures and detection mechanisms 
Prevention 
It is difficult to prove non-compliance with internal policies etc. 
It limits data sharing opportunities 
 
Figure 1 lists the possible solutions proposed by interviewees to close the 
legislative gap. This shows that thirteen interviewees noted that additional 
legislation would be required to provide them with additional powers. 
However, this was not seen as the only solution. 12 interviewees observed 
that, in the new operating environment with more third party outsourcing, it is 
essential that relevant access clauses be built into supplier contracts. A 
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further two participants noted that such access clauses should also be 
extended to grant agreements.  
 
Figure 4:Methods for dealing with a shortage of legal powers 
Similarly, for staff, 12 interviewees from all three groups observed that it is 
also important to allow for appropriate investigative techniques to be built into 
contracts of employment. Such clauses, it was posited, set out clear 
expectations and, in doing so, help enforce fraud deterrence. These 
participants noted, however, that there could be difficulties in enforcing such 
contracts. In addition, one interviewee noted that they rely on implied legal 
powers to protect their services, assets and finances from fraud. Another 
observed that: 
The first step is to ensure that counter fraud receives professional 
recognition – to give others confidence that fraud investigators will 
use any powers given to them responsibly and proportionately within 
some form of regulatory framework through which they are held to 
account. 
Once this was in place, it was argued, further legislation could be considered. 
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Counter Fraud Skills 
A similar picture emerges for available counter fraud skills. The research 
showed that, even if central government bodies had the legal powers needed 
to combat fraud effectively, they may struggle to use them successfully. Of the 
bodies surveyed, 7/16 had no Accredited Counter Fraud Specialists (ACFS) 
and only 2/16 had qualified Association of Certified Counter Fraud Specialist 
staff. Only 8/16 had staff with accountancy or internal audit qualifications and 
only 1/16 surveyed organisations had a staff member trained in computer 
forensics or Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 recoveries. Finally, 3/16 
relied on internal audit to provide one or more of the skills needed. 
Evidence from interviewees may explain this position. Only five interviewees 
(20 per cent) reported that their organisations had carried out some form of 
counter fraud competencies assessment, of which only one worked for a 
counter fraud team, and only five had some form of training plan. Interviewees 
also put forward organisational reasons for the absence of a competency 
analysis. The scale of the competencies needed to implement the fraud 
management model is such that skilled resources are bought in when needed; 
counter fraud awareness, prevention and activities are seen as stifling 
innovation; and fraud is not seen as a major organisational problem that 
needs an expensively trained resource to tackle. For example, one counter 
fraud practitioner observed that: 
The appetite for fraud awareness, identification and prevention has 
yet to be fully defined. This is because such activities are seen as a 
stumbling block to progression of new and innovative services. 
Interviewees from all 26 organisations were asked to list their top ten core 
skills and competencies and, between them, identified 66 different skills and 
competencies that, in their view, need to be employed to deliver an effective 
counter fraud service. To help draw out key themes each competency has 
been grouped into one of four categories: innate skills; technical skills; 
organisational skills; and professional skills. These categories have been 
designed to reflect the different ways people learn and acquire knowledge. 
Innate skills are acquired by individuals over a long period of time and are 
often recruited into the business and continually developed. Technical skills 
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can be acquired through appropriate training courses, and if supported by 
adequate levels of practical experience, can be learned fairly quickly. 
Organisational skills relate to a particular organisation and are acquired 
through in-house courses and work experience, are often specific to the 
employer and form an integral part of service development. Finally, 
professional skills are often externally determined, learned through a period of 
study, and require technical experience to discharge effectively. 
Many settled on identical and similar competencies and skills, suggesting that 
there is a common understanding of personal characteristics and knowledge 
needed to deliver an effective counter fraud service. Table 5 lists the top 25 
competencies, according the number of interviewees who mentioned each of 
these, in their interview.  Figure 3 summaries the number of skills placed in 
each of the four specified categories. 
The most interesting aspect of interviewees’ answers is the prevalence of 
innate skills in the list of the most popular 25 competencies. Given the 
importance of these personal qualities to counter fraud teams, it is surprising 
that some interviewees report that these are either absent or only partially 
developed in their staff. While interviewees from counter fraud teams stated 
that some of their staff lacked interpersonal, interviewing, technical and legal 
skills, all reported that their staff had well developed analytical skills. Such a 
view was not, however, shared by the organisations in the wider counter fraud 
community and policy and professional bodies groups. This suggests that 
there may be a divergence of internal and external views on the quality of 
some aspects of counter fraud work. This does not necessarily imply poor 
analytical skills. It may be due to an expectation gap and the way in which 
counter fraud teams are perceived when discharging their responsibilities. 
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Figure 5: 25 most commonly sought counter fraud competencies 
No Skill Core? % Absent? 
Innate Skills 
1 Well developed analytical skills Be able to work with, and analyse meaningfully, qualitative and quantitative data 23 88% 5 
3 Objectivity and independence Work must be free from bias, reflect the facts and lead to balanced conclusions 17 65% 5 
6 Tenacity and resilience Tactfully follow through all tasks to completion without being deflected by others 15 58% 2 
7 Influencing skills Ability to present views to senior managers and represent organisation credibly 14 54% 8 
11 Judgement and proportionality Recognise where fraud risk is in organisational priority and devise apt response 5 19% 0 
12 Honesty / integrity / impartiality Evidence based work which from which personal bias is absent 5 19% 0 
13 Excellent written skills The ability to write reports and other documents clearly, concisely & persuasively 5 19% 2 
15 Commitment to ethical values All work must subscribe to the seven Nolan Principles of Public Life 4 15% 0 
16 Communication skills Ability to bond effectively with all –e.g. managers, victims, witnesses & suspects 4 15% 1 
19 An enquiring mind and intensive critical thinking Ability to know where fraud exposures are / will be and devise workable solutions 3 12% 0 
20 Innovative mind set Ability to think of new ways to tackle both current and new issues 3 12% 2 
21 Adaptability Ability to apply personal and professional skills to a variety of situations 3 12% 1 
Technical Skills 
2 Interpersonal and interviewing skills The ability to strike positive relationships with others and interview effectively 22 85% 6 
5 Technical and legal knowledge The ability to progress tasks according to the law and best industry standards 17 65% 7 
9 Strong process mapping and analysis skills Ability to document, analyse and assess systems and processes 8 31% 2 
18 Accuracy in record keeping and attention to detail Keep meticulous and accurate file records and notes in a methodical manner 4 15% 0 
24 Ability to pull together and summarise evidence Ability to present evidence in a logical, coherent, consistent and objective manner 3 12% 0 
25 Case building and management skills Taking ownership of a case from start to finish which meets pre-set objectives 3 12% 1 
Organisational skills 
10 Collaborative working Ability to work in partnership with other internal and external departments / bodies 6 23% 3 
14 Awareness of legal and technical limitations Knowing what is legally and technically allowed and remaining within these limits 5 19% 1 
22 Understanding data sources and applying detection techniques Knowledge of MIS systems and how to interrogate these for anomalies 3 12% 1 
23 Knowledge of the fraud landscape Knowledge of the organisation’s business and likely fraud exposures  3 12% 1 
Professional Skills 
4 Strong risk assessment and management skills Ability to identify, assess and assist others to control fraud risks 17 65% 6 
8 Strategic assessment Ability to see the big picture and draft strategies to deal with identified fraud risks 9 35% 7 
17 Well developed IT and cyber security skills Understand IT fraud risks and the measures needed to detect and combat these 4 15% 2  
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Figure 6: No of identified competencies by category 
Those interviewees who placed importance on organisational skills report that 
key issues such as: knowledge of the fraud landscape; an awareness of legal 
and technical limitations; and an understanding the different data sources and 
being able to apply appropriate detection techniques to these, were largely 
being met. The issue of most concern was collaborative working where 
50 per cent of interviewees, who saw this as a key skill, reported that their 
staff either fully or partly lacked this ability. This lack of collaborative working 
may extend to allied skill groups and partly explain why counter fraud 
managers are reporting a lack of access to professional skills such as 
strategic assessment, risk assessment and management and IT and cyber 
skills.  
Figure 4 shows that most interviewees use a range of training methods that 
include external and internal training courses, desk training, mentoring, and 
continuous professional development (CPD). 
 
Figure 7: Training methods employed 
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Civilian counter fraud investigations can be intrusive and lead to harm 
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central government should be overseen and controlled to minimise this risk. It 
considers both self-regulation, in the form of internal management supervision 
over counter fraud operations, and whether some form of external regulation, 
such as state control, co-regulation (where occupational codes of conduct are 
given legislative authority) or enforced (or quasi) self-regulation might be 
appropriate (Australian government, 2007).  
The decision on whether to regulate or not, and the choice of regulatory 
mechanism, is complex. Effective regulation can have a positive influence 
over service standards and individual and corporate behaviours and reduce 
costs (Samarajiva 2001; Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2007; Andrews et al., 2008; 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009). However, it can also have high compliance 
costs, lead to sub-optimal performance by regulatees due to inflexibility in 
regulatory processes and stifle innovation (Porket, 2003; Centre on 
Regulation and Competition, 2004; Australian government, 2007). In addition, 
regulation through external bodies, such as professional institutes, does not 
always guarantee appropriate behaviour in all circumstances (Snyder, 2014). 
There was widespread support from interviewees for being subject to internal 
supervision with all 26 believing this to be necessary for the reasons given in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 8:  Principal reasons for the need for internal supervision 
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Furthermore, of the 14 survey recipients who expressed an opinion, eight (57 
per cent) considered that the current regulatory arrangements were 
satisfactory and of the remaining six, five (83 per cent) were in favour of an 
approach based around self-regulation. Therefore, there appeared to be 
significant support for internal supervision within the central government 
counter fraud community. 
Of the reasons provided in Figure 5, the most striking were the need to 
prevent an abuse of position; the development and maintenance of 
appropriate quality and professional standards; and having the right 
employees with the appropriate skill mix. These, coupled with the need to 
ensure that counter fraud teams remained within their legal and regulatory 
frameworks, suggest that the issues covered by this research resonate with 
others working in this field. 
17 interviewees (65 per cent) were in favour, in principle, of some form of 
external regulation. One commented:  
Counter fraud teams need to be subject to scrutiny and oversight to 
prevent an abuse of the powers invested in them and to ensure 
that management, cost and performance pressures do not lead to 
serious issues being overlooked. 
Other common reasons cited by interviewees for the need for some form of 
external regulation included the maintenance of quality and the prevention of 
poor and illegal practices (4 interviewees), and the provision of an externally 
validated framework that underpins independence (3 interviewees). One 
interviewee also noted that:  
Any team invested with formal powers to conduct investigations 
into others should be subject to scrutiny by a competent authority 
to ensure that these powers are used proportionately, appropriately 
and only when necessary.  
Accountability and transparency were also issues raised by participants. One 
interviewee posited that increases in accountability and transparency in recent 
years had led to an improvement in public confidence in the police. Another 
considered that the need for transparency and accountability also extended to 
the civilian counter fraud teams. They noted that: 
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Counter fraud staff must build and maintain public confidence – 
and this means transparency in the way they operate and clear 
accountability for their actions – which can, in extreme 
circumstances, lead to damage to their professional and personal 
life and ultimately, cause those found guilty of fraud to lose their 
liberty.  
Redress for those who have suffered damage or loss following civilian counter 
fraud activities was also cited as a reason for some form of external regulation 
by nine interviewees drawn from all three groups. Another interviewee noted: 
There also need to be frameworks in place to allow those affected 
by investigations, or other counter fraud activities, to complain and 
for errant counter fraud professionals to be prevented from 
practising, where this is appropriate. 
12 interviewees (46 per cent) from all three groups posited that the need for 
external regulation increased with the growth of legal powers. Thus, they 
believed that the larger the number of powers, and the greater the potential 
for intrusiveness, the greater the need for external regulation. 11 interviewees 
(42 per cent) from all three groups also observed that an anomaly exists at 
present whereby the way in which traditional law enforcement use their 
investigatory powers is externally regulated (for example by the IPCC), but 
civilian counter fraud professionals are not. 
Nine interviewees (33 per cent), by contrast, were against the external 
regulation of counter fraud services. They cited three key reasons for this: a 
lack of investigative powers which meant that this level of external oversight 
was unnecessary; its predominant focus on internal matters, many of which 
end with disciplinary hearings and contract sanctions; and adequate levels of 
internal management oversight. One counter fraud practitioner went further, 
arguing that: 
Civilian counter fraud should be, and remain, business as usual for 
public administration. [They] noted that professional bodies already 
regulate many of the individuals who work in the counter fraud 
space. For example, many of those who work in the counter fraud 
already belong to accountancy or internal audit institutes. 
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Another interviewee concluded that a resolution to the regulation issue was 
for a convincing case to be made for it. They saw this as being the need for a 
professional and effective service to counter the £20 billion lost to fraud [by 
the public sector] annually and to underpin effective governance and financial 
regulation. They also observed: 
With frauds now spanning both private and public sectors (as 
private companies provide services to departments), there is a 
need for a central regulator to span all counter fraud operations 
that should be financed accordingly. 
Research results demonstrate that the choice of regulatory regime is complex. 
One interviewee posited that, of the four main options, regulation by 
government, profession, organisation or self-regulation, counter fraud teams 
would prefer the fourth option. In their view it was the: 
Easiest and cheapest to implement and gives teams the greatest 
amount of operational latitude. 
This is borne out by the survey results. Figure 6, which summarises survey 
respondent views on their preferred form of regulation, shows a marked 
preference for self-regulation where such a preference was expressed. 
 
Figure 9:  Survey respondents' regulatory preference 
20 interviewees (77 per cent), representing all three groups, expressed 
support for external regulation on two levels. The first of these was the 
personal level. These interviewees considered that counter fraud staff should 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Regulation by
government
Regulation by
professional
body
Self-Regulation No Preference
1 1
5
9
Overview Journal Article  
      Page 
 
21 
have a professional code of ethics and take personal responsibility for acting 
in accordance with professional, educational and technical standards. 
The second was the organisational level. The same interviewees felt that 
there needs to be some oversight as to how organisations exercise their 
counter fraud responsibilities corporately. One interviewee noted that the 
CIPFA Voluntary Code of Conduct for counter fraud operations, published in 
May 2014, is an attempt to meet this need (CIPFA, 2014). 
Those interviewees who expressed an opinion felt that any external regulation 
should include one or more of the functions listed in Figure 7. From the roles 
listed in this figure, it can be inferred that there was some support from 
interviewees for the greater involvement of professional institutes in counter 
fraud regulation. The prevention of abuse by counter fraud staff is of particular 
interest. This is because externally imposed regulation, through the 
enforcement of professional standards, may help limit public service 
organisations’ risk and exposure to challenge. When asked, more than 90 per 
cent of respondents to the survey stated that liability for their actions lay with 
the employing organisation rather than individual members of staff. 
 
 
Figure 10: Principal tasks for external regulation 
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Conclusion 
Fraud is a complex crime involving a number of different offences and 
behaviours. Current actions to deal with it suffer from a variety of hindrances, 
such as a fragmented legal framework, a lack of core skills, resourcing issues, 
poor intelligence and data sharing, barriers to collaborative working, a lack of 
standards and regulation. The UK Government is alive to these difficulties and 
has published a strategy and set in place a reform programme to deal with 
them. However, this is at a strategic level only and has yet to tackle some key 
issues such as how law enforcement can work with civilian counter fraud 
teams more effectively given that the latter often do not have the legal 
powers, skills, infrastructure or regulation needed to make this work.  
This research suggests that there are inconsistencies within Government 
policy towards tackling fraud and corruption. The Government’s promotion of 
a zero tolerance culture is difficult to achieve with limited police resources to 
tackle fraud related issues and the inconsistent legal framework within which 
civilian counter fraud specialists operate. There is also some evidence that, 
even if the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks were in place, central 
government counter fraud teams do not have the basic mix and quantity of 
skills to make best use of them. 
The Government’s proposals for managing public sector fraud are thus 
unlikely to bring about the transformation they envisage. There is insufficient 
resource within the law enforcement community to tackle the £billions lost to 
the UK public sector annually from fraud unrelated to the tax and benefits 
systems; and, the position is unlikely to improve in the short to medium term. 
Consequently, unless the Government empower their civilian counterparts to 
provide the complementary service it envisages, the disruption of fraudulent 
activity is unlikely to occur on the scale required to make significant reductions 
into losses suffered (Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011b, p. 7; Doig and Levi, 
2009, p. 200; Gannon and Doig, 2010, p. 45). 
This, in turn, runs the risk of undermining their strategy much of which is 
centred on fraud prevention. If it becomes clear that the investigative and 
enforcement capability to counter fraud is sub optimal, and that the chance of 
avoiding detection and prosecution is high, it is unlikely that those tempted to 
Overview Journal Article  
      Page 
 
23 
commit fraud will be deterred, or prevented, from doing so. The Government 
recognised this by noting that not all frauds are preventable – by even the 
most robust controls (Cabinet Office and NFA, 2011b, p. 17). 
Therefore, the Cabinet Office’s response to countering fraud needs to 
reconcile better the tensions between their desire for an enhanced response 
to fraud, and the civilian capability to deliver this. There needs to be a 
recognition that the legal and regulatory environment within which civilian 
counter fraud services are delivered within Government may be in need of 
reform. The Government has not indicated that it intends to amend the current 
legal and regulatory environment – in a way that would support their stated 
preference for a zero tolerance process. This may explain why more than one 
half of the respondents appear to accept the current status quo and thus the 
culture change needed within their organisations, to provide a more effective 
counter fraud service, is unlikely to occur. 
Consequently, the Government’s plan to bring about this culture change 
through improving fraud awareness, through the education of staff and 
encouraging inter-agency co-operation, needs further development. This 
much needed culture change needs to filter down to the structures within 
organisations and the way in which these are managed and controlled. 
Counter fraud champions and their senior managers should focus more on 
the role of the counter fraud department in the stewardship of assets and their 
priority for funding and action. In particular, human resources departments 
need to work with their finance, internal audit and counter fraud colleagues to 
undertake a pay, grading and skills audit, produce a training plan and equip 
the teams properly.   
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